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Abstract: - Describing north east Nigeria without making mention of insurgency would be incomplete, as the 
resurgence of insurgent groups particularly Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād commonly refered to 
as Boko Haram have wreaked havoc in the region for close to 12 years. In response to the activities of insurgent 
groups, the African Union Peace and Security Council and the authority of the Lake Chad Basin Commission 
moved to expand the mandate of the MNJJT to include counter insurgency. The task force is made up of 
orcesrom Cameroon, Chad,Niger Nigeria and Benin republic. The task force have been able to make 
considerable gains against insurgency, however, insurgency still remains a major challenge in the region, which 
makes necessary an appraisal of the task force in justifying the purpose of its creation. The study reveals major 
challenges like inadequate technical knowhow, inadequate funding amongst others threatens the operations of 
the MNJTF. The paper recommends that military response is solely incapable of addressing insurgency, 
member States need to re-examine counter insurgency policies to be multidimensional. 
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Insurgency has evolved to become a major feature 
of the international system, particularly in the 21st 
century, having being aided by advances in science 
and technology [1]. Over time, countries have begun 
to view insurgency as a threat to global peace and 
stability as against a threat to a country, for this 
reason governments of countries have often resorted 
to the establishment of multinational military 
actions to counter insurgency and other forms of 
threat to global peace and stability. The 1989 
demolition of the Berlin Wall and the end of the 
Cold-War era led to an increase in the attention paid 
to Multinational Forces [2], some examples of 
Multinational forces include; North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 
the European Multinational forces, etc. 
Being faced by militancy, political conflict, drug 
and human trafficking, ethno-religious crisis, trans-
border crimes and insurgency, governments of 
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria 
established the MNJTF to curb all manners of these 
illegal activates across the borders of member states 
particularly the actions of the insurgent group Boko 
Haram. The insurgent group Boko Haram was not 
always the violent group that it is today, prior to the 
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group’s violent nature from 2009, the group was not 
viewed as a threat to Nigeria or any of her 
neighbours, Muhammad Yusuf’s teachings were 
usually televised which enabled him garner 
followers across the region and beyond [3]. Prior to 
the popularity of Muhammad Yusuf’s [4], identifies 
two driving factors that enabled Yusuf’s teachings 
to appeal to large crowd. The first being that; back 
in 1999, Borno State Politicians formed a gang of 
armed youths to take out political opponents, but 
later in 2002 and 2003, these politicians had little 
use of the armed youths, making them to neglect the 
need of the armed gang known as Ecomog [5]. In 
the quest to find means of livelihood while still 
armed; some of them turned into the violent and 
illegal activities, while some others fell into the 
open arms of Muhammad Yusuf’s teachings of 
Salafism; stating the waywardness of Nigerian 
politicians and the increasing influence of the 
Western World. The armed youths and Muhammad 
Yusuf were a perfect match, he was speaking 
against the ill practices of politicians, and the armed 
youths felt used and abandoned by the politicians 
after the 2003 election. Yusuf’s readiness to assist 
his followers to establish businesses, and also help 
them get married went round the region which made 
people to come from across the region to become 
disciples. The growing followership and nature of 
teachings began to draw attention to the group; 
several cases were brought up against him, but none 
of them were able to lead to Yusuf’s arrest. Then in 
2009, Yusuf’s was extra-judicially killed in police 
custody with the thought that his death was going to 
quell the group, however this abuse of power and 
abuse of human right by the Nigerian police force 
led to the radicalization of the group under 
Abubarkar Shekau who moved to transform the 
group into an insurgent group that makes use of 
terror to spread its message with aim to achieve a 
political change of creating a caliphate governed by 
Islamic law in North East Nigeria.  
Since the transformation of the sect into a terrorist 
group in 2009, the group has adopted such violent 
tactics like suicide bombing, Car bomb, use of IED 
and kidnappings. At the early stage, the insecurity 
threat was considered to be a Nigeria problem, 
coupled with fact that the Nigerian government 
under the leadership of Goodluck Jonathan was not 
willing to have the foreign soldiers on Nigerian soil 
in the fight against Boko Haram [6]. 
However in 2012, the transnational nature of the 
group was reflected when the brother in law of 
Muhammad Yusuf “Alhaji Babakura Fuggu” told 
former president Olusegun Obasanjo that about 40% 
of the membership are from Cameroon, Chad and 
Niger [7], this led to the imperative decision to 
combine forces to tackle insurgency in the region. 
The product of this idea was the Multinational Joint 
Task Force. A combination of forces from 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin 
Republic, the troop is made up 8,500. Despite the 
creation of this Task Force, insurgency still remains 
a major character of the Lake Chad Basin Region. 
Therefore, this paper questions the effectiveness of 
the MNJTF COIN measure and Challenges to the 
COIN measures. 
 
2 Methodology  
Qualitative research is conducted through the 
collection of data and the analysis thereof is a 
simultaneous process [8]. This view is also shared 
by [9], they posits that in qualitative research, data 
analysis is conducted through the classification of 
events, persons, items, ideas, things, themes etc. on 
this premise, analysis of data is this paper was 
chronologically and categorically organized.  Major 
sources of data for this paper were gotten from 
reports, government publications, literature survey, 
conference paper, books among others. Data 
gathered were then descriptively analyzed. 
 
3 Literature Review   
3.1 Insurgency 
The concept of insurgency has been subjected to 
series of definitions by scholars in social sciences 
discipline; also the term has been used 
interchangeably with such terms like terrorism, 
revolution, and guerilla warfare. Owing to the 
misuse and diverse use of the word by different 
scholar, it becomes important to define what 
insurgency is; a comprehension of it is tantamount 
to appraising the MNJTF. insurgency is seen to be 
“a technology of military conflict characterised by 
small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla 
warfare from rural bases [10]” Another definition is 
put forward by [11], they define insurgency as “a 
protracted violent struggle by non-State actors to 
attain their political aims and objectives– often 
emancipation, greater autonomy, or subversion of 
existing authorities – against the current political 
authority (the incumbent).” The definition by [10] 
unlike the definition put forward by [11] fails to 
capture the essence of insurgency by characterizing 
it to be a tactic of small lightly armed band who 
operate from rural bases practicing guerilla warfare. 
This definition is inconclusive because it also fails 
to capture the true purpose of insurgency. The 
definition overtly recognises insurgency to have a 
military purpose. The definition put forward by [11] 
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does more to capture the true nature of insurgency 
by defining it as actions by non-State actors who 
have political aims and objectives. However, this 
definition does not do well to indicate whether these 
actions are guerilla warfare or not. A leading scholar 
on insurgency; O’Neill conceptualizes insurgency is 
undoubtedly being the most predominant category 
of organized struggle since the rise of politically 
organized societies” [12: p-1]. He further posits that 
insurgency is a general all-encompassing concept 
that denotes to a struggle between a government and 
an organized cluster or opponent in which the 
opponent or sect make use of both violence and 
political resources to change, reform, or uphold the 
legitimacy of one or more of four key aspects of 
politics” [13]. while citing [12], [13] identifies the 
four keys of politics as being; “ (1) the respect and 
dignity of the State territory, (2) the system of 
political administration in the country, (3) the 
people in power and (4) the public and foreign 
policies of the state.  
Over the years, insurgency that is rebellion against 
the state have taken various forms. They are riot, 
coup d’etat, guerrilla, revolution and terrorism. 
Table 1: Comparison of Forms of Insurgency 
The table above shows the different forms of 
political violence that threatens the regime of a 
state; it helps to characterize them based on 
insurgency level, number involved, struggle 
duration, violence, threat to regime and spontaneity. 
Although there are a number of strategies to 
insurgency, this paper focuses on terrorism as a 
strategy of insurgency. The term terrorism is usually 
used interchangeably with the term “guerrilla” [14] 
sees insurgency as a strategy of insurgency, 
terrorism differs from guerrilla; the tactics 
associated with these strategies are different. A 
major difference between them is that guerrilla often 
tries to establish and maintain physical control of 
territory. It is not a common nature of terrorists to 
establish and maintain physical control of a State’s 
territory. As a strategy of insurgency, terrorism 
mostly makes use psychological influence to 
achieve their political objectives. As a strategy of 
insurgency, terrorism mostly makes use 
psychological influence to achieve their political 
objectives. Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency in 
contrast to all other strategies of insurgency 
thoroughly has no regard for internationally set rules 
of war engagement. In the case of guerrilla war and 
even conventional wars, these rules are often 
broken, and there are penalties for offenders. But in 
the case of terrorism, terrorists generally operate in 
the absence of rules by failing to recognise the 
difference between combatants and noncombatants. 
The entire population is viewed as a means to their 
end, and this is why terrorism unlike guerrilla, 
demonstrations, has no legal standing domestically 
in any country and internationally. And this is why 
terrorism has been defined as “an illegal form of 
warfare [14] of which war is fought on their own 
standards, capabilities, and no rules of engagement. 
Terrorists mode of operations have often taken the 
form off setting explosives in public places, 
kidnapping, killing of opponents, hijacking, hostage 
taking,  barricading themselves in enclosed places to 
prevent access to the public. Take for example al-
Qaeda’s hijacking of two planes and their flying of 
the planes into the Twin-Towers (World Trade 
Centre) in   the United States of America on 
September 11, 2001, or Boko Haram kidnapping of 
over 250 Chibuk girls from school [15]. 
 
3.2 Counter Insurgency  
The term counter insurgency as indicated by the 
name refers to measures set in place to halt 
insurgency in whichever form it surfaces such as; 
coup, guerrilla, nonviolent resistance, revolution, 
terrorism etc. [16]The focus of counter insurgency is 
to prevent the change of regime or to reinstate the 
structure of authority. Counter insurgency also 
refers to a theory of war that may sometimes be 
used to describe an established set of methods that a 
State may use to counteract, defeat the advances of 
insurgents.   
The term is traceable to the twentieth century, 
particularly ascribed to the President John F. 
Kennedy’s administration; the administration was 
tackling how to deal with what they perceived as 
Soviet efforts to destabilize and undermine 
governments of the Third World countries and bring 
them under Soviet regime preceding decolonization. 
Counter insurgency is a combination of 
psychological, economic, military, paramilitary 
actions utilised by State government to counteract 
the advances of insurgents. The term became an 
international phenomenon as a result of the al-
Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001. Following the 
attack, international and regional organisations have 
made counter insurgency a priority. 
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In the process of countering insurgency, the host 
governments do work with foreign government and 
international organisations to mitigate the 
opposition and defend the legitimate government .It 
is a very tactical operation; it is proactive in nature 
and involves elements of a State’s power. The 
operations involved attempt to realize unity of 
between the several units that forms the force, these 
may be; multinational organisations and 
intergovernmental organisations. Processes involved 
in counter insurgency are; planning; recruiting; 
financing, intelligence gathering, analysis of 
information; advice; training; organisational and 
technical assistance; infrastructure development; 
and information engagement. 
For insurgency to be mitigated, the nature of the 
insurgency has to be taken into consideration. The 
factors propelling the actions are meant to be 
studied [17]. In essence this posits that for policy 
makers to adequately formulate and implement 
policies that would counteract insurgency, it is 
expedient that they have credible knowledge on 
factors that caused the uprising. In the words [18], 
an all-inclusive response to insurgency is a product 
of the root causes. 
[16] adds that the system of administration is also a 
key factor to consider when planning counter 
insurgency plans; he explains that counter 
insurgency plans that prove effective in defending 
the authority of the government in an authoritarian 
state may prove to be ineffective when adopted to 
counter insurgents in a democratic regime. 
 
3.2.1 Approaches to Counterinsurgency 
Counter insurgency as indicated by the term refers 
certain set of responses threats of insurgency this 
requires a deep understanding of the threat matrix, 
which arises from knowledge of the relevant 
political, cultural, security, economic and social 
factors coupled with understanding the motivation, 
objectives and modus operandi of the insurgent 
groups [19]. Also pertinent to securing the support 
and the trust of the populace is to ensure the 
dissemination of quality governance aided through 
ensuring strict adherence to the rule of law, 
provision of basic social amenities to the people, 
political reforms, and economic reforms. Therefore, 
a good counter insurgency operation ought to be 
multidimensional [3]. 
 
3.2.1.1 The Enemy-Centric Approach:  
This approach to counterinsurgency is aimed at 
defeating an identified enemy as it main objective, 
while considering other factors as secondary 
objectives. Simply put that the total amelioration of 
the security threat in all forms they appear while not 
paying much attention to nation building or support 
of the people is what constitute the enemy centric 
approach. Within this approach are variances such 
as soft power versus hard power, direct altercation 
versus indirect altercation, violent versus 
nonviolent, etc. 
 
3.2.1.2 The Population Centric Approach 
This approach is the direct opposite of the above 
approach to counter insurgency. This approach 
centers on the protection of citizens in other to win 
the support for the regime in the process of 
countering insurgency. This approach does not 
ignore the use of direct force, however it is not 
considered to be the primary means to curbing 
insurgency. [20] describes this approach as 
population first response to insurgency. This 
approach is more supported by scholars than the 
above approach; U.S counter insurgency style is 
patterned after is approach [3]. 
In the fight against insurgency, it is rarely seen for a 
single approach to be utilized, instead what we have 
is a mix of elements from both approaches at 
varying levels, the levels change over time 
depending on the decision of the regime. 
 
4. The Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) 
The MNJTF that was formed to curb insurgency in 
the Lake Chad region was not the first of its kind. 
Prior to 2012, during the reign of General Sani 
Abacha there existed a task force of its kind to 
police the northeastern borders of Nigeria [21] the 
sole aim of the task force was to curb banditry and 
aid movement of people and properties. At 
inception, the force assumed a National front as 
only Nigeria was involved. However by 1998, the 
force assumed a more multinational front with the 
involvement of Niger and Chad and it had the 
mandate of securing the borders in the Lake Chad 
region. At this time the headquarters of the force 
was located in Baba town of Borno State Nigeria. 
This case changed in 2012. In 2012, the expansion 
of the infamous group necessitated the equal 
expansion of the group’s mandate to include counter 
insurgency with a major focus on Boko Haram. The 
multinational nature of the taskforce was even 
enlarged in 2012 to include elements not only form 
Nigeria and Niger but from Chad, Cameroon and 
Benin Republic. MNJTF was tasked to operate with 
other counter insurgency operations like the JTF 
Operation Restore Order and Operation Lafia Dole 
[22]. 
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4.1 Funding and Logistics of the MNJTF 
A large percentage of the funding of the operations 
of the MNJTF comes from the countries that make 
up the task force. However, significant amount also 
come from donor countries and institutions. At the 
2016 Addis Ababa Donors’ Conference, financial 
commitment to the Task Force recorded $250 
million. The Nigerian Government pledged a sum 
$100 million, and as at 2016, had met $30 million of 
her commitment. Also, the United Kingdom 
provided $ 3.5 million to the outfit, while the 
European Union provided E50 million. Also to 
Benin, Chad and Niger, the regional Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States provided for the running of the 
Task Force a sum of $1.5million to assist with these 
countries financial burden. Despite the numerous 
contributions from external parties, the funding of 
the Task Force is heavily depended on the Member 
States of the MNJTF, and it should be noted that 
these member States due to the operations of 
insurgent groups are heavily weighing down on 
economic activities in the countries (Alufoge, 2020). 
The United States has also been involved in the 
fight against insurgency in the region, at the demand 
of the Nigerian government, USA deployed drones 
to survey Sambisa forest in search of the abducted 
Chibuk girls. Also, 12 US troops were deployed to 
Nigeria to train 650 combatants. In addition, 
equipment and financial assistance have been 
provided by US to help in the fight against 
insurgency, and such assistance is estimated to be 
71 US dollars [19]. Through the European Union 
and African union partnership, EU provided a sum 
of 50 million euros to support the activities of 
MNJTF against Boko Haram at African Union 
Commission’s donor Conference in 2016 (Alufoge, 
2020). In assistance of the task force, France 
provided 10 transporters aircrafts for mobility, 200 
armored vehicles, four Assault Rafale fighters, 
French Army helicopters stationed in Mali, general 
atomic mq-9 reaper unmanned aeriel vehicles, 
pledged to donate E130 millions to develop 
amenities, three lance roquette unitaire (LRU) 
systems, and some members of the Task Force 
received military training from French armies [19]. 
 
4.2 Achievements of the Multinational Joint Task 
Force 
The MNJTF had its first major operation in 2016. 
Despite major challenges, the Task Force recorded 
major strides against the Boko Haram. Starting in 
the month of June of 2016, and ending in November 
of the same year, Gama Aiki (Complete the Job) 
was in [24]. The operation was held in Borno State 
and other parts of the LCBR, it entailed integrated 
military actions from the member States. The 
success of the Gama Aiki to liberate areas that were 
under the control of Boko Haram has been able to 
boost the morale of the Task Force.  
In the 11th month of 2015, a strike by the MNJTF 
sector 2 was launched against Boko Haram. The 
success of the strike included the surrender of an 
estimate of 250 Boko Haram fighters. In 2015 the 
Cameroon faction of MNJTF was able to counteract 
a large number of Boko Haram fighters [25]. The 
MNJTF were also able to free hostages, recover 
weapons and clamp-down on some Boko Haram 
training camps.  
Achievement of the Task Force is visible in the case 
that incidence of bombing have largely reduced, this 
is a result of tightening the flow of weapons, 
information and financial supply [26] Also, the 
effectiveness of the Task Force was echoed by the 
UNSG for Political Affairs, he stated “the UN 
commends the actions of the Lake Chad Basin 
countries to curb insurgency through the MNJTF 
[27]. 
The task force has been able to set free communities 
that were under the control of the infamous group, 
such communities include Gore Blangafe, Gore 
Mahamat, Kirta-Woulgo, Segui, Damboure and 
Chaugry, these liberated communities remain under 
the protection of the task force. Also the MNJTF has 
been able to weaken the capabilities of Boko 
Haram’s ability to inflict sufferings on civilians, in a 
2019 post by Premium times, reporting a statement 
by the field Commander Chikezie Ude, he reports 
that attacks on citizens previously at 2000 in 2015 
dropped to 573 in 2018. 
In addendum, members of the Task Force have been 
able to kill or lockup members of the insurgent 
group. In Cross Kauwa Lake Chad area, 52 Boko 
Haram fighters were killed in April 2019, 5 in 
Bormo state on the 31st of March 2019 etc. MNJTF 
has also been able to arrest Boko Haram fighters in 
Nigeria and Cameroon, and over 240 Boko Haram 
fighters surrendered to the MNJTF in 2016 [26]. 
 
4.3 Challenges of the Multinational Joint Task 
Force 
MNJTF is not a full prove plan against insurgency 
in the LCR and it faces some challenges that impede 
its operations [28]. Zamfir (2015) is also of this 
opinion, he perceives the MNJTF to be faced mainly 
by logistical difficulties and absence of a true 
regional front from member States. This is echoed 
by [26] who point out the manner in which member 
States are only interested in fighting the insurgency 
to the extent at which it affects them and not how it 
affects other States. This can be attributed to be the 
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reason the MNJTF was not quickly reactivated, as 
neighbouring States viewed the Insurgency to be a 
Nigerian problem. The neighouring States alone are 
not to blame, according to [25], the initial challenge 
to the MNJTF was caused by the Nigerian 
government, which were not willing to allow 
international intervention on Nigerian soil. [25] 
opines that the MNJTF was considered to be a form 
of threat to pride and sovereignty of the Nigerian 
State. Even after the reactivation of the Task Force, 
the division in the group is reflected in the structure 
of the group, with each country having a National 
headquarters and undertaking unilateral missions.  
[19] states that there is rivalry in the region, 
neighouring countries are threatened by Nigeria as a 
result of her economy, population and natural 
resources. This fear makes the surrounding 
francophone countries to fear being overpowered by 
Nigeria. The rivalry between the francophone 
countries and Nigeria have been reflected in the 
operations of MNJTF, for instance, the Chad sector 
of the MNJTF deployed troops to Nigeria without a 
prior notice to the Nigerian division of the task 
Force. In the case of Niger and Nigeria, Nigerien 
soldiers referred to Nigerian soldiers as cowards, 
while the latter responded by calling the former 
serial looters [25]. For a regional response to 
insurgency, this was not a healthy start. This weak 
start spiraled into a series of clumsy and 
unorganized military actions by the Task Force. It 
should also be noted that whenever there was a 
victorious strike against Boko Haram, individual 
sectors do claim responsibility for the success of the 
mission instead of ascribing the success to the 
regional Task Force. It took several attacks by the 
insurgents to get the member States to cooperate. 
A major challenge inhibiting the operations of the 
MNJTF is that the financial contributions from 
member States have been insufficient to curb the 
insurgent group’s activities [26], this resulted in 
sourcing finances from external partners, 
notwithstanding the financial contributions from 
external partners, the contribution still didn’t meet 
up to the estimated amount of US$700 million. It is 
worthy of note to state that the economic down turn 
that member States are experiencing as at the time 
of observation have also made it difficult for them 
to meet up with their  pledges [25]. The countries 
are also faced with the burden of providing for 
refugees and internally displaced persons. Hence 
these countries are financially strained. Also, the 
UN proposed to set a trust fund for the maintenance 
of the Task Force in other to mobilize the much 
needed logistical and financial support. However 
this has yet to be established and this remains a 
major challenge to the operations of the [26] 
The regional military response is not only 
underfunded, but there is also the problem of 
inadequate technical-knowhow [30]. He discusses 
further that the MNJTF is not trained to handle 
unconventional warfare. Unlike conventional 
warfare in which the enemy is known and rules of 
engagement are followed, the fight against Boko 
Haram is unconventional; rules of engagement do 
not apply, also states that the problem of technical 
knowhow and under-funding as trickled down into 
lack of commitment on the parts of the soldiers who 
feel they are unequipped sitting ducks to be preyed 
upon by Boko Haram [30]. 
 
5 Conclusion and Problem Solution 
Insurgency is major feature of the Lake Chad region 
and if not properly manage, will be a threat to the 
entire West Africa. The sole use of force to curb 
insurgency has been able to limit the activities of 
insurgents, but has not been able to entirely bring an 
end to the incessant menace, and this is because 
insurgency is a symptom having multidimensional 
causes; not just a product of religious extremism, 
but a combined product of factors like economic 
hardship worsened by the drying up of the Lake 
Chad that serves as source of livelihood for many; 
religious intolerance propagated through hate 
sermons by religious leaders, distrust in the 
government due to years of political malpractices by 
government officials etc. 
The Task Force in their attempts to curb insurgency 
has also inflicted pain on noncombatants, which has 
fed into the rhetoric of the Boko Haram. The extra 
judicial execution of Mohammed Yusuf in custody 
made him a martyr and his death was a powerful 
tool to bring sympathizers together. In the same 
vein, citizens who have experienced the brutality of 
the MNJTF first hand are likely to believe the 
message of the insurgent group, which limits the 
effectiveness of the Task Force.   
Even though there is relative stability and the 
attacks by the group has reduced, there should not 
be a recess in counter insurgency, this regional 
response should be reinforced and strengthened to 
prevent a resurgence of Boko Haram or another 
group from taking its place. 
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